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A U T H O R

Trace C. Lasley

I

am a senior at UK in the Economics department, after
having fulfilled the degree requirements for a Bachelor of
Arts in History and Philosophy. I joined Phi Beta Kappa
this year. I am the recipient of the Charles Brent Award in
History, Departmental Honors in Philosophy, and the Traveling Scholars Award from the Office of International Affairs.
I have also just been offered the David L. Boren Scholarship
through the National Security Education Program, which
will allow me to study Amharic, History, and International
Relations at Addis Ababa University in the fall. I intend to
pursue graduate studies in International Affairs and work
in the federal government, working on African affairs.

“We saw not clearly nor understood,
But, yielding ourselves to the master hand,
Each in his part, as best he could,
We played it through as the author planned.”
-Alan Seeger

Mentor: James Fackler, Ph. D.
Professor of Economics, Gatton College of Business and Economics
Trace Lasley has undertaken an extensive investigation into the economic conditions leading to the war between Eritrea and Ethiopia in 1998. Eritrea, which
was peacefully transformed from a province of Ethiopia to an independent nation in 1993, wanted to have special trade status with Ethiopia, without trade
barriers. In late 1997, Ethiopia erected significant barriers, harming the Eritrean
economy in the process. Furthermore, Eritrea introduced its own currency at an
exchange rate with the Ethiopian Birr that was far from its equilibrium value,
heightening the economic tensions between the two countries. Lasley makes a
persuasive argument that these economic factors were the primary reasons for
the initiation of hostilities in May, 1998.
This paper is the result, in part, of research conducted in Ethiopia by Lasley
after he won a travel grant from the University of Kentucky. In addition, he has
worked with the U.S. State Department and the Ethiopian Embassy in developing data sources as well as obtaining background interviews with government
officials knowledgeable about the conflict.
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We Saw Not Clearly
Nor Understood:
The Economic
Background of
the EthiopianEritrean War
Editor’s Note
The University of Kentucky Office of Public Relations
provided the following press release:
Trace Lasley, a fifth-year senior at the University of Kentucky majoring in history, philosophy, and economics,
has been working for a year to be able to attend his
last year of college in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. The hard
work paid off. Lasley, a native of Paducah, KY., has
been awarded a $19,500 National Security Education
Program (NSEP) Boren Scholarship to study Amharic
language at Addis Ababa University.
“Ethiopia has a lot of powerful stereotypes,” Lasley
said. “My interest in Ethiopia started in high school
and I haven’t been able to stop reading and studying
about the area since. The more I read, the more I see
a glorious culture.”
Lasley received his scholarship May 31 at an
awards ceremony in Washington, D.C. Created in 1991,
NSEP awards scholarships to American students for
study of world regions critical to U.S. interests (including Africa, Asia, Central & Eastern Europe, Eurasia,
Latin America & the Caribbean, and the Middle East).
NSEP was designed to provide American undergraduates with the resources and encouragement they need
to acquire skills and experiences in areas of the world
critical to the future security of the U.S., in exchange
for a commitment to seek work in the federal government.
“My goal is to do analytical work focused on East
Africa for the U.S. government,” Lasley said. “While in
Addis Ababa, I will be taking Amharic language classes
as well as political science and international relations
classes focused on African politics and Ethiopian history classes.” Lasley’s first time traveling outside the
United States was when he visited Ethiopia in March to
finalize paperwork. He will be in Ethiopia from October
2006 to July 2007.
“When I received the scholarship I really felt as
though all of my career doors opened and my future
became clear,” Lasley said. “This is the best thing that
could have happened for my career — everything is
coming into focus.”

Abstract
In 1991 hope reigned in Ethiopia. There was a
peaceful transition of governments after a long period of civil strife. The main guerrilla movements in
Ethiopia, the TPLF and the EPLF emerged from the
war as brothers-in-arms ready to embark on a new
era of peace and prosperity. Just seven years later,
Eritrea invaded Ethiopia and a war ensued that cost
70,000 lives and did incalculable damage. This paper
explores the economic relations between the two
countries to show their significance in the eruption
of the Ethiopian-Eritrean War.
There are three recurring themes in the recent
economic history of these two nations: protectionism,
Eritrean status, and the introduction of Eritrea’s new
currency, the Nakfa. My work explores the ideas of
the TPLF and EPLF when they were emerging guerrilla
movements. An examination of the economic climate
of the region sheds light on the policy concerns of
the governments, culminating with the introduction
of the Nakfa, which was the point of no return. It is
through these concepts that the decade preceding the
war must be analyzed. In this paper, I re-examine
statistics, policies, and documents with the hope of
revealing a new understanding of the implications
of economic relations, and maybe providing a better
avenue through which to pursue peace.

Introduction
Many factors drive nations to war. There are wars of
conquest, wars to gain access to resources, and, of
course, the big one – religious wars. But some wars
seem to have much more complex causes. World War
I escalated due to the significant problem of entangling alliances. The different battles of the cold war
were fought due to ideology and fear. International
conflicts always seem to flare up, each with its own
special causes and concerns. At times, war seems
inevitable. Therefore, when what seemed to be a
minor border incursion in the Horn of Africa prompted
two of the world’s poorest countries to engage in open
combat for two years at the end of the millennium, it
didn’t seem too surprising. Especially in this war-torn
region of the world, some might even have called it
predictable.
“Eritrea won independence from Ethiopia in 1993
after a 30-year struggle but relations between the two
remained tense and exploded into war in 1998, that
cost some 70,000 lives.” (Reuters, 2006)
This excerpt from Reuters Alertnet shows the
limited extent of the information most news sources
share about the background of the current conflict.
None of these sources conveyed the complexities of
the situation. For instance, this 30 year struggle for

Timeline of Key Events
Acronyms
TPLF
EPLF
ELF
EPRDF
PFDJ		
TGE

Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front
Eritrean People’s Liberation Front
Eritrean Liberation Front
Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front
People’s Front for Democracy and Justice
Transitional Government of Ethiopia

independence saw not only the overthrow of the centuries old Solomonic
dynasty of Haile Sellasie I, in 1974, but also ended only when guerrilla
groups in Ethiopia allied themselves with the main Eritrean separatist group and jointly toppled the socialist government. After that, the
transitional government of Ethiopia peacefully acknowledged Eritrea’s
independence.
In May of 1998, war broke out in the Horn of Africa. The two nations, which seemed to be embarking on a new period of peace, instead
launched a two-year campaign that saw 70,000 people killed and close to
a million displaced, and did substantial damage to the region. My goal
is to show that the causes of this war, while complex, stem directly from
the economic relations between Ethiopia and Eritrea. I have examined
the policies of the Ethiopian government and the position of the Eritrean
side. Given the dependence Eritrea had on Ethiopia, and the barriers
Ethiopia erected, economics contributed the most to the cessation of
negotiation and to the commencement of open hostilities. It is not my
objective to assess blame.
This work relies on a few assumptions. First I assume that the
Statistical Data obtained from the World Bank is reasonably accurate.
However, as is the case with many underdeveloped nations, statistical
data is sparse. I try to stick with the big numbers — GDP, imports, and
exports — to arrive at my conclusions. Second, as is the case with most
conflicts, especially modern ones, there are (at least) two sides to every
story. Unfortunately in this case, both sides are polar opposites. I found
a few sources that seemed more objective than others. I believe that I
was able to account for any bias that is present in my sources. I tried to
stick to positive statements only, as opposed to normative. Finally, the
biggest assumption is not my own. According to the Ethiopian-Eritrean
claims commission, Eritrea invaded Ethiopia, in violation of international
law. If this is indeed the case, it allows study of what motivated them
to pursue military action. (EECC, 2005)
First, I will examine the policies of the Ethiopian Guerrilla movement
that emerged from the socialist period as the main group in the new
coalition government of Ethiopia. Second, I will explore what status the
Eritrean government had envisioned for the new nation in the shared
future of the neighbors. Finally, I will show how the introduction of
Eritrea’s new currency, the Nakfa, in 1997 was ill-timed, ill-received,
and proved to be the “straw that broke the camel’s back,” because it
was only 6 months after introduction that the war broke out. I will also
briefly discuss the other possible causes of the war and why they are not
as likely to be correct as the economic causes presented here.
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Map 1: Horn of Africa

Source: United Nations Cartographic Section,
map no. 4188 Rev.1
January 2004

I. Protectionism
From the 1980s, protectionism steered Ethiopian
economic policies, which angered Eritrea. The
Tigrayan-dominated Ethiopian government operated
to ensure past slights would not return. Before 1889
and the rise of Amharic rulers, the northernmost
province of Tigray held high importance. It was
marginalized during subsequent rulers. After the rise
of socialism in 1975, guerrilla movements in Tigray
evolved and eventually took control of Ethiopia.
Upon its ascension, the new government embarked
on policies that gave special treatment to businesses
of Tigrayan origin. With this treatment came
bureaucratic hurdles for the importation of Eritrean
goods that directly competed with Tigrayan facilities.
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Tigrayan favoritism specifically angered Eritrea, as
opposed to the rest of Ethiopia, because Eritrean
exports accounted for more than half of its GDP. The
evolution of Ethiopian trade policy began to directly
affect Eritrea, as favor toward Tigray grew.
The Horn of Africa is home to four nations: Somalia, Djibouti, Ethiopia and, as of 1993, Eritrea (See
Map 1). Eritrea was once part of Ethiopia. Before
World War II, it was a colony of Italy. Following the
occupation of Ethiopia by Italy during 1936-1941, the
territory was under British military administration.
After the war, a special committee was formed to
determine what to do with Italy’s former colonies.
In 1952, after 11 years in political limbo, the United
Nations determined, after polling the Eritrean people
that it was to become an autonomous state, federated
under the Ethiopian crown.
This solution seemed to make most parties happy.
The Ethiopians were happy because they retained
access to the ports on the red sea, Assab and Massawa. The Eritreans were happy because they had
their own government. This arrangement worked
for only a short period, however. Soon Ethiopian
policies seemed to disregard Eritrea’s autonomy. The
Ethiopian official language Amharic was to be taught
in the schools and the Monarch was exercising too
much control over Eritrean affairs. In 1962, the Eritrean parliament voted to abolish the federation and it
became a province of Ethiopia. Many argued that this
action was due to political corruption and previously
marginal separatist movements flooded into the scene.
One group rose to the top: The Eritrean Peoples Liberation Front (EPLF). They began small but quickly
grew in power and popularity. (Marcus, 1997)
On May 21, 1991, with guerrilla forces surrounding the capital and EPLF forces secure in nearly all of
the major towns and cities in Eritrea, the dictator of
Ethiopia, Mengistu Haile Mariam fled Addis Ababa.
In the first week of June, many events occurred in
the capital. Meles Zenawi declared himself acting
head of state, to be followed 5 days later by the establishment of a provisional government with Tamrat
Layne as Prime Minister. The EPLF had agreed to
postpone the referendum for independence for 2
years and announced “unrestricted Ethiopian use”
of the port facilities of Assab. (Henze, 1995, 26) On
July 1, a National Conference to form a Transitional
Government convened. Among others, the EPLF was
in attendance. At Africa Hall, the famous building
where the Organization of African Unity had been
founded in 1962 by Haile Selassie, over 20 groups
were represented by nearly 100 representatives.
Under the constitution that they adopted, previous
regime institutions were to be dismantled. It also
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affirmed “The right of nations, nationalities, and
peoples to self-determination [and] of independence
when the concerned nation/nationality and people is
convinced that the above rights are denied, abridged,
or abrogated.” (Henze, 1995, 28)
Perhaps ironically (at least for this study) economic discussions and the agreement on Eritrea to
decide its own fate, convened on the same day as
the National Conference. “While the people should
decide about economic issues themselves, no power
should impose its own economic policy on them by
putting this in the program as part of the Charter. The
[Ethiopian Government’s] proposal that an economic
directive which governs the economic activity of the
transitional period be [later] drafted by the Council
was adopted by an overwhelming vote.” (Henze,
1995, 29) The position of Finance Minister also was
not filled. The pattern of postponement of economic
issues would continue, as Ethiopian expert Paul
Henze, traveling extensively in Ethiopia at that time,
noted, “Ethiopia is in a condition of political effervescence with economic issues taking lower priority.”
This postponement was believed to be the best
course of action, so the bureaucratic system of the
previous government could be discharged. It was not
until November, 1991, that the economic policy of the
newly formed Transitional Government of Ethiopia
(TGE) was released. Among other things, it stressed
privatization and free-market policies. Optimism
waned as the reality of governing set in. Political
tolerance eroded as did the official strategy of liberal
economic policies. This euphoric period would not
last. Due to TPLF influence within the Ethiopian Government, the original political theory of the guerrilla
movement would return. As rights eroded, it seemed
that many of the beliefs of the TPLF, during the dark
days out in the bush, would return. Soon, the holding
action on economic decisions collapsed.
The current political reality prevalent in the northernmost province, Tigray, is tied directly to the issues
of the distant past. Tigray began its rise in importance
with the Axumite Empire (ca. 5th century BCE – ca.
7th century CE). Christianity was introduced to the
Horn of Africa through Tigray and King Ezana in
the 4th century CE. It rapidly spread in power and
influence until the rise of Islam (ca. 7th century CE)
created a communications vacuum in the African
Christian world. The Highlands of Ethiopia (in which
Tigray is located) remained isolated for hundreds of
years until Yohannes IV became Emperor of Abyssinia
(Ethiopia) on January 21, 1872. Yohannes rose to
power after aiding the British in a mission to defeat the
Emperor Tewodros, who, after failing to receive British aid in conquest, poisoned some British subjects
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in Ethiopia and imprisoned others. Yohannes ruled a
sizeable area, demanding tribute from a large number
of feudal lords. His capital was Mekelle. During his
reign, he twice defeated a sizeable Egyptian Army,
returned the ports of Assab and Massawa to Ethiopian
control, lost them to Italy, and ultimately died in the
Battle of Matemma on May 10, 1889 against Muslims
from the East. (Marcus, 1997)
After Yohannes’ reign, Tigray fell from prominence and, under the reign of the next emperor, Menelik II, investment in development was intentionally
diverted. Menelik located his capital at Addis Ababa,
in central Ethiopia, far from Mekelle and Tigray. As
an ethnic Amhara, his innovations and policy favored
that region and its people. Notably he completed the
Addis Ababa/Djibouti railroad, connecting the new
capital to the French colony to the East. Menelik
is famous for defeating the Italians at the Battle of
Adwa in 1896, which successfully shielded Ethiopia’s
independence from European conquest. However,
this famous battle scarred the lands of Tigray and
caused the slow deaths of thousands of the Tigrayan
people. Seven years of famine followed the military
expedition, after the 100,000 man army consumed
local Tigray village food stores. (Marcus, 1997)
During the grand and popular reign of Haile Sellassie I (1930-1974), Tigray was further marginalized.
The year before his coronation, following a famine in
the region and a refusal by the government for tax relief, peasants revolted. Called the Woyane Rebellion,
it was quickly put down, thanks to the single plane
that comprised the Ethiopian Air Force. The domestic
concerns of Ethiopia were largely put on hold in 1935
as the Italians, based in Eritrea, invaded and occupied
Ethiopia for six years. After this time, investment and
growth was centralized in Addis Ababa and the other
major ethnic Amharic cities and discouraged in the
outer provinces. Meanwhile, “Tigray was drained of
its human and material resources by heavy taxation
and recruitment into the army.” (Minority Rights
Group, 1983, 17)
The TPLF began operations during the fall of
the monarchy and the rise of the socialist military
government. In 1975, the TPLF fought its first battle
in Dedabit in western Tigray. They resented the marginalization imposed by successive Ethiopian regimes
and, perhaps, seeing an opportunity with the political
chaos in Addis Ababa, began their revolution. While
past revolutions had failed, the popularity of the socialist government (known as the Derg) was so low
in Tigray and most other areas that the movement
gained support. By 1979, guerrillas controlled nearly
85 percent of the countryside and a few towns and
cities. (Young, 1995)
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The TPLF was a guerilla movement that favored
protectionism based on a strong sense of nationalism. Nationalism became a core context in the TPLF
doctrine. The “Manifesto of the TPLF” stated “the
first task of this national struggle will be the establishment of an Independent democratic republic of
Tigray.” (Young, 1995, 97) They held the view, popular among many student unions, that Ethiopia was
a “prison of nationalities,” and believed that “[selfdetermination] means the creation of VOLUNTARILY
integrated nations and nationalities. However, if the
present oppression and exploitation continues or
intensifies, it means the creation of an independent
[republic].” (emphasis in the original) (Young, 1995,
100) Economic nationalism is exercised through protectionist policies. Nationalism promotes the benefits
and sanctity of the nation above outside nations and
institutions. Protectionism seeks to impose tariffs or
other restrictions to retain the sanctity of the nation
through a healthy domestic market.
The TPLF formed a coalition government in Addis
Ababa, but it retained most of the control over policy.
The economic policies of the coalition government,
the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic
Front (EPRDF), tended to favor the Tigray province,
and reflected its protectionist past. Possibly because
of the TPLF’s senior position in the coalition government, official policies of the Ethiopian government are
seen as giving unfair advantage to the Tigray region.
An Ethiopian hotel owner operating in Addis Ababa
expressed the belief that the government, in its control
of the banking mechanism and general regulatory
authority, supplies businesses in Tigray with an unfair
advantage. A US official supported these allegations
by stating that the majority of bank loans and land
leases go to Tigray- and TPLF-owned or affiliated
companies. On a national level, the EPRDF policies
toward Eritrea have centered on competition between
Eritrea and Tigray. Trade barriers were erected so
that the main outlet in Ethiopia for Eritrean goods,
Tigray, was protected from competition. As late as
April of 1998, the President of Eritrea believed that the
“Ethiopian trade policy was designed to protect the
market for Ethiopian (and Tigrayan) manufactured
products” (Negash and Tronvoll, 2000, 44).

II. Eritrean Status
The issue of Eritrea’s status raised unsettled economic problems that heightened tensions between
the countries. During the period of 1991–1997 the
status of Eritrea remained in question. Much of the
debate was fueled by historic links and disconnects
with Ethiopia. After Egyptian, Ethiopian, and Italian
domination, Federation, Province-ship, and, finally,
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independence, deciding how to treat Eritrea would not
be an easy task. Tensions grew because of Eritrea’s
demand that it be given special treatment with regard
to trade. This policy conflicted with Ethiopia’s stance
that Eritrea be treated as any other nation. Coinciding
with growing dependence upon Ethiopia’s market,
the question of status fueled the tensions between
the two countries.
The euphoria following the defeat of the Derg
was short lived. The EPLF agreed to postpone independence until a referendum could be held. The
TPLF became the ranking members in the Ethiopian
Transitional government. They agreed, over some
opposition, that a referendum would be held in Eritrea
alone, not the rest of Ethiopia as some influential
groups had wanted. The referendum was held on
the 24th of May, 1993, and Eritreans voted for their
independence from Ethiopia. The new government
of Eritrea, the Peoples Front for Democracy and
Justice (PFDJ) was born of the ranking members of
the EPLF. Isais Afwerki, leader of the EPLF became
president. The problems between Ethiopia and
Eritrea began almost immediately. The overarching
problem was the question of Eritrean status. Was
Eritrea to be treated as any other foreign nation, or
was it something special? For all the care that went
into making a peaceful transition from province to
nation, neither government respected the issues that
inevitably arose.
The questions concerning the status of Eritrea
really began in 1941. At that time, the Italian colonial administration had been replaced by a British
military mission occupying enemy territory. Almost
immediately the question of what to do with Eritrea
arose. It was generally agreed that the British should
administer the territory until after World War II, at
which time Great Britain, the USA, the USSR, and
France began deliberation. While the USA and the
USSR had geopolitical positioning to think about,
France favored the colonial status quo, and the British
wanted support for their east Africa holdings: Sudan
and British Somaliland. After sending a UN delegation
to Eritrea to determine what the people wanted, it was
found that they were divided between independence
and union with Ethiopia. The compromise became
federation. Eritrea was to be an autonomous state,
federated under the Ethiopian Crown. (Iyob, 1995)
The federation lasted only 10 years. Many argue
that Ethiopian politics could not digest the term federation. There had always been a central government,
with regional lords holding varying degrees of power.
In 1962, Haile Selassie abolished the federation and
declared Eritrea a province of the Ethiopian Empire.
Just before this declaration, the Eritrean separatist
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movements had begun. In 1958, a group of Eritrean
exiles in Egypt launched the Eritrean Liberation
Movement. The ELF was a Muslim peasant movement that began successful campaigns against the
government after dissolution of the federation, and
popular support both at home and abroad began to
favor their cause. At the same time, the EPLF began
its movement. Unlike the conservative ELF, the EPLF
espoused Marxism and quickly grew in popularity
amongst the peasantry. After much domestic infighting, the EPLF became the most significant group in
the movement. (Pool, 2001) (Iyob, 1995)
Like the TPLF, the EPLF touted nationalistic
rhetoric but focused more on independence as opposed to economic nationalism. Indeed, the economic
status of Eritrea, as envisioned by the EPLF, centered
on a liberal trade policy but with a peculiar Marxist
ideology. The EPLF program was nationalist and
envisioned independence as the first and foremost
objective. “Its strategic goal was always Eritrean
independence.” (Pool, 2001, 60)
The primary objectives of the EPLF, as published
in the official program, included: “Establish A
People’s Democratic State, abolish the Ethiopian
colonial administrative organs and all anti-national
and undemocratic laws, and punish severely Eritrean
lackeys of Ethiopian colonialism who have committed
crimes against their country and people.” (Cliffe, 1988,
205) The trade status envisioned by the EPLF was a
cross between free-trade and proletariat idealism.
Encouraged no doubt by the historic status of Eritrea
as a port region, the EPLF hoped to “establish trade
relations with all countries irrespective of political
systems.” (Cliffe, 1988, 206) Contrary to typical
liberal trade policies, the EPLF also intended to “ban
exports of essential consumer goods and limit the
import of luxury items.” (Cliffe, 1988, 205-207).
The economic position adopted by the PFDJ
rested on their belief in a special status for Eritrea.
They attempted to operate as an autonomous nation but to have unfettered access to its historically
primary trading partner, Ethiopia. The Eritrean government rejected the Ethiopian idea that it should
be treated as any foreign nation would. The PFDJ
believed that because of the nation’s historically intertwined relations with Ethiopia, it should face no
barriers to trade. The special status envisioned by
Eritrea allowed it to trade as any other nation would
to the rest of the world but, in trade with Ethiopia, it
could essentially act as a province. Concerns arose
in Addis Ababa when goods from Ethiopia were
being bought, duty-free by Eritrea but sold abroad.
Essentially Ethiopia was competing with itself, but
due to Eritrea’s operation of the main port of call for
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Ethiopian exports, Assab, Eritrean businesses were
receiving unfair advantage.
The trade agreements signed by both countries
would have justified the Eritrean position. Among
other things, the agreements hoped to establish a
free trade area in which there would be no tariffs
on goods originating in either of the two countries.
However, problems arose on implementation. Most
people in the EPRDF did not acknowledge that the
question of Eritrean status would be a problem. The
prime minister of the TGE, Tamirat Layne, who later
lost his position officially on charges of corruption,
believed otherwise. He thought the status of Eritrea
needed to be settled quickly and concretely. In 1995
he went to Eritrea with the intent of solidifying the
trade agreements. He was relieved of his position
in 1996, and in 1997 he was arrested on charges of
corruption that may have been true. However, it is
important to note that many believe his arrest was
politically motivated. It was his position on Eritrea
that many felt caused dissension between him and the
party line, in particular with the new Prime Minister
Meles Zenawi. (Eritrean Profile) (Personal Conversation with Ethiopian Scholar)

III. Introduction of the Nakfa
Eritrea’s issuance of the Nakfa, and Ethiopia’s unfavorable response, prompted the climax of the economic disputes. Eritrea’s Nakfa was released at the
height of poor economic relations between Ethiopia
and Eritrea. After a number of demands regarding
special status, and allegations over protectionism,
Eritrea swiftly instituted their new currency. The
Nakfa was circulated without any clear agreement
as to how the currency would trade. Ethiopia had
little time to prepare for the sudden introduction of
the Nakfa and, as a result, erected significant hurdles
for exchange. The new barriers that were created in
response to the Nakfa proved too much for Eritrea
to bear. The Nakfa was issued while Eritrea was at
the height of its dependence on Ethiopia’s market.
Ethiopia’s response to the Nakfa further frustrated
Eritreans until they felt no recourse but to settle their
harbored grievances with force.
The decade preceding the war was a turbulent
period of economic shifts. At that time, both countries were being lead by former guerilla leaders who
may not have grasped the complexities of governing
a nation. The policies of both nations reflected strict
adherence to party doctrine and neither allowed for
criticism. The economic climate that resulted from
these policies and/or influenced these policies reflects
this inflexibility. In addition, when the trade patterns
are examined, trends that hindered relations between
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the countries become evident.
Although both governments agreed on implementation of a new currency in Eritrea, in 1997 the currency introduction caused severe disturbances in the
trade conditions between Ethiopia and Eritrea. The
first impasse arose when Ethiopia refused to accept
the Nakfa on par with the Ethiopian Birr, as Eritrea
had not only proposed, but intended. Ethiopia’s
reason was that the monetary policy of Eritrea did
not reflect that of Ethiopia.
Ethiopian monetary policy is such that the
government retains a certain degree of control over
exchange and interest rates. The Ethiopians proposed
a Letter of Credit System under which transactions
of more than 2000 birr had to be conducted using a
hard currency such as the US dollar. Eritrea feared
that this would promote smuggling and would hinder
cross-border trade. They believed that the Letter of
Credit system was a protectionist policy designed to
impede competition in Tigray from Eritrean goods.
As a result, Eritrea rejected the system and did not
help in the regulation along the borders. Ethiopia
resented this failed cooperation and pressed for dual
authority on the Letter of Credit’s execution. (Negash
and Tronvoll, 2000) (Fessehatzion, 2002)
Eritrea’s introduction of the Nakfa caused new
fears that may have prompted the war. As late as April
of 1998, just one month before the start of the war,
Eritrea’s president released a statement condemning
Ethiopia’s trade policy as being protectionist and unfair to Eritreans. He believed that the development of
Tigray’s industry was conducted to promote market
substitution that would one day lead to the exclusion
of Eritrea entirely from the Ethiopian market.

IV. Other Causes
Ideology
Ideological differences have also been posited as
another potential cause of the war. From the beginning, both the TPLF and the EPLF were separatist
movements. However, the EPLF cited their unified
national identity as a cause for separation while the
TPLF party line was that Ethiopia was a prison of
Nationalities. The TPLF felt that the different ethnic
groups in east Africa were militarily dominated by
the Amharic monarchy and were only held together
through force. It was only with EPLF urging that the
TPLF would lessen this rhetoric for a more palatable
unity-in-diversity theory. After forming the new
Ethiopian government, the TPLF restructured Ethiopia into a federation of 9 ethnic states, any of which
could separate if the cause was just. Many feel that
it was this position that most frightened the Eritrean
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government. Eritrea is also made up of different ethnic
groups; unfortunately, close to 60% of Eritreans are
ethnic Tigrayan. It was widely believed that if the
idea of ethnic identity superseded national identity,
then the Tigrayans of Eritrea would want to separate
from Eritrea to join the state of Tigray. (Negash and
Tronvoll, 2000)
Although the conclusion is sound, this belief
ignores certain political realities. For instance, while
the situation in the horn is far from stable, it is not
likely that a citizenry that supported independence for
over 30 years would suddenly opt for inclusion into an
Ethiopian state. At this time, most Eritreans identify
themselves as such and not by ethnicity. Also, this position ignores the dominance the Eritrean government
has over the press. Despite the international praise
of the “progressive” EPLF during the independence
movement, upon ascension to power, they centralized
the media and have strictly controlled its diffusion. It
is unlikely that the idea of rejoining Ethiopia would
ever be allowed to spread unhindered by the government. (Cliffe, 1988)

Border Demarcation
No discussion of the Ethiopian–Eritrean War would
be complete without exploration of the primary cause
described by the newspapers, and that now seems to
be the major impasse to peace: the border (See Map
2). The border dispute arose because the border was
not properly demarcated in 1993; even during the Italian colonial period the border was unclear. There are
no major landmarks to establish a border; it is mostly
open territory free of rivers and mountains. Thus, any
attempt to demarcate must rely on maps dating back
to the turn of the 19th century, and to treaties signed
by monarchs in Italy and Ethiopia, neither of which
holds power today.
My position is not to say that the border plays
no significant role in the conflict. In fact, without
demarcation, I believe that no amount of negotiation
or compromise will ever bring peace. However, to
claim that 70,000 soldiers lost their lives and billions of
dollars were spent to go to war all for the small town
of Badme, which even the Prime Minister of Ethiopia
called a “Godforsaken Village,” is misguided at best.
As late as August of 1997, both sides were agreeing to cooperate on border demarcation. After minor
clashes in areas surrounding Badme, the two sides
agreed to set up a commission to investigate the border
claims and demarcate accordingly. On May 8, 1998,
ironically while the newly formed border commission
was in session, a group of Eritrean soldiers surrounded
Badme. Failing resolution, soon more Eritrean troops
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entered Ethiopian administered territory. Thus the
border war started. (Henze, 2000) (Negash and
Tronvoll, 2000)
The escalation of force did not match the diplomacy both sides seemed to advocate before (and
during) May. It seemed that despite the agreements
to take it slow and allow proper implementation of
the border to commence, Eritrea used force and then
refused to back down, at which point negotiations
completely ceased. Ethiopia claimed its sovereignty
had been violated, and that it would use “any means
necessary” to rectify the situation and safeguard its
territorial integrity. Eritrea essentially viewed this
declaration as an act of war. At this point, the rhetoric
and conspiracy escalated.
Ethiopia posited that this was another incident in
a long pattern of behavior of Eritrea having disputes
with its neighbors; Eritrea had had minor conflicts
with Sudan, Djibouti, and Yemen. Eritrea said that
Ethiopia had occupied their territory as a “fallback”
position for the TPLF if the ethnic federal experiment
failed, and they again called for an independent
Tigray. The value of resources spent over a marginal territory does not support the contention that
the primary cause of the war was border concerns.
Furthmore, both sides were in agreement until May
of 1998. There must have been another motivating
force. (Negash and Tronvoll, 2000)

V. Economic Causes of the Ethiopian–
Eritrean War
The economic situation, for the period of 1993 to
early 1998, before the war, was a bit confusing.
Ethiopia adopted protectionist measures and wanted
to treat Eritrea as it would any other nation. Eritrea
wanted free trade and special status in the Ethiopian
economy.
What was the overarching economic climate?
Both countries experienced modest gains in this
period. In Ethiopia the data show a steady growth
period from 1993 through 1997. The GDP increased
from US $4.6 billion to nearly $6 billion (See Figure
1). This increase coincides with a significant decrease
in aid as a percentage of government expenditures,
which dropped an average of 19.53% after 1993. Per
capita income also increased dramatically, rising by
nearly 24% (See Figure 2). National saving increased
to over $506,000 (2006 US dollars) by 1997, which is
almost 4 times the amount of 1993.
Eritrea’s economy was also marked by growth,
but it was much more dramatic. The GDP increased
from $487 million to $716 million (2006 US dollars).
Per capita income rose from $759 (international $) to
over $1000. (World Bank Online)
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Map 2
Disputed Border

Here is where it gets interesting. By 1997, 67% of Eritrea’s goods
were heading to Ethiopia, accounting for over 20% of its GDP. Most of
its imports, however, were agricultural products from Ethiopia. From
1993-1997, food production in Eritrea decreased. This decrease coincides
with a rise in Ethiopia of not only food production but also food price.
Food exports from Ethiopia, while the data is sparse, indicate a clear rise
before 1998. Exports never made up more than 17% of Ethiopia’s total
GDP. In Eritrea however, in 1997, exports accounted for a sizeable 30%
of income (See Figure 3). Where were these exports going? To Ethiopia.
The volume of exports going into the Ethiopian market reached nearly
70% of all goods and services exported in 1997. Therefore, access to
the Ethiopian market accounted for nearly 20% of Eritrea’s GDP. Thus,
to the extent that Eritrea’s economy depended on access to Ethiopia, the
trade policies of the EPRDF were too much for Eritrea to bear. Therefore,
only 6 months after the last of a series of trade barriers were erected,
Eritrea invaded Ethiopia. (World Bank Online)

Figure 1
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Figure 2

After the fall of the Derg in 1991, the economic decisions of the new government began immediately to
affect the relationship between Ethiopia and Eritrea.
The impact of these policies on trade volume was
significant (See Figure 4). The TPLF-led EPRDF issued policies favoring the Tigray province, due in large
part to its past marginalization. The new government
established manufacturing centers to serve as import
substitutes. Also, they erected new trade barriers,
such as targeted restrictions on certain goods and supporting poor import infrastructure. These measures
seemed to target Eritrea, because many of the goods
being produced in Tigray could and were often being
provided by Eritrea. Eritrea grew frustrated at what
seemed to be discriminatory practices that directly
hurt its economy.
Eritrea had envisioned a special status in its economic relationship with Ethiopia. In its past relationship, the status of Eritrea was often in question. In
less than a century the region of Eritrea changed from
colony, to occupied territory, to a state federated with
Ethiopia, to province, and, finally, to independence.
In 1993 the newly established independent state of
Eritrea saw itself occupying a special place in relation
to Ethiopia because of this shared past. This was not
a view shared by the Ethiopian government. After
the euphoria of the post revolutionary period faded,
the new government wanted to treat Eritrea as it did
any other nation. Although some measures had been
in place to facilitate their special status with Eritrea,
Ethiopia soon negated these agreements. These actions ran counter to the primary economic policies of
Eritrea. Due to the volume of trade it did with Ethiopia, special status would have reduced unnecessary
costs and thereby boosted the economy of Eritrea.
Ethiopia’s disregard for this concern furthered the
decline in relations between the two nations.
By the time the Nakfa was introduced in November of 1997, the trade agreements between Ethiopia
and Eritrea had dissolved. Despite this hostile environment, when new disagreements arose regarding
Eritrea’s new currency, they issued it anyway. This
sparked a problem regarding international trade between the two countries. Eritrea insisted on policies
that Ethiopia had, in writing, said they would not
uphold. In addition, the protectionist tendencies of
the EPRDF were intensified during this period. Further restrictions arose regarding volume, and trade

Figure 3

Figure 4
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facilities. These actions were seen by Eritrea as more
in a series of trade barriers being erected by Ethiopia.
Due to the increased reliance on access to Ethiopia,
these policies further enraged Eritrea to the point that
it pursued military intervention.
Due to the dependence the Eritrean economy had
on unfettered access to Ethiopia, trade barriers would
have a much greater impact than in other countries.
The protectionist policies of the EPRDF, based on
its dominance by the TPLF and the history of the
Tigray region, had the potential to be devastating to
the Eritrean economy. Finally, the introduction of the
Nakfa took place without necessary agreement on
its implementation. It was ill-timed by Eritrea and
ill-received by Ethiopia. By 1997 the economy of Eritrea was so intertwined with Ethiopia’s market that
hindered access had potentially critical implications.
Thus, when a further round of trade barriers was
erected by Ethiopia, Eritrea invaded. This explanation seems to fit better than ideological differences
or border disputes as the cause for war. Whatever
the cause of war, all sides should want peace. In this
case, peace cannot be realized until both sides cease
the propaganda, recognize their shared concerns, and
work toward a mutually beneficial future.
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